Same-sex marriage will be legal in Iowa!

Citing Marbury v. Madison, McCulloch v. Maryland, Lawrence v. Texas, Dred Scott v. Sanford, and Brown v. Board of Education, the Iowa Supreme Court today ruled that the state statute defining marriage as between a man and a woman is unconstitutional under the Iowa Constitution. Beginning in three weeks, same-sex couples will be able to marry in Iowa. (Read the full, awesome, unanimous opinion here. No. 07–1499.)

I'm going to quote some of the best excerpts:

In fulfilling this mandate under the Iowa Constitution, we look to the past and to precedent. We look backwards, not because citizens’ rights are constrained to those previously recognized, but because historical constitutional principles provide the framework to define our future as we confront the challenges of today.

Our responsibility, however, is to protect constitutional rights of individuals from legislative enactments that have denied those rights, even when the rights have not yet been broadly accepted, were at one time unimagined, or challenge a deeply ingrained practice or law viewed to be impervious to the passage of time. The framers of the Iowa Constitution knew, as did the drafters of the United States Constitution, that “times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress,” and as our constitution “endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom” and equality. ...

Finally, it should be recognized that the constitution belongs to the people, not the government or even the judicial branch of government.

p. 15.

The primary constitutional principle at the heart of this case is the doctrine of equal protection. ...

The point in time when the standard of equal protection finally takes a new form is a product of the conviction of one, or many, individuals that a particular grouping results in inequality and the ability of the judicial system to perform its constitutional role free from the influences that tend to make society’s understanding of equal protection resistant to change. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes poignantly said, “It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.” ...

So, today, this court again faces an important issue that hinges on our definition of equal protection. This issue comes to us with the same importance as our landmark cases of the past. The same-sex-marriage debate waged in this case is part of a strong national dialogue5 centered on a fundamental, deep-seated, traditional institution that has excluded, by state action, a particular class of Iowans. This class of people asks a simple and direct question: How can a state premised on the constitutional principle of equal protection justify exclusion of a class of Iowans from civil marriage?

pp. 16-18.

Therefore, with respect to the subject and purposes of Iowa’s marriage laws, we find that the plaintiffs are similarly situated compared to heterosexual persons. Plaintiffs are in committed and loving relationships, many raising families, just like heterosexual couples. Moreover, official recognition of their status provides an institutional basis for defining their fundamental relational rights and responsibilities, just as it does for heterosexual couples. Society benefits, for example, from providing samesex couples a stable framework within which to raise their children and the power to make health care and end-of-life decisions for loved ones, just as it does when that framework is provided for opposite-sex couples.

In short, for purposes of Iowa’s marriage laws, which are designed to bring a sense of order to the legal relationships of committed couples and their families in myriad ways, plaintiffs are similarly situated in every important respect, but for their sexual orientation. As indicated above, this distinction cannot defeat the application of equal protection analysis through the application of the similarly situated concept because, under this circular approach, all distinctions would evade equal protection review. Therefore, with respect to the government’s purpose of “providing an institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons,” same–sex couples are similarly situated to opposite–sex couples.

pp. 28-29.

The case was decided on state constitutional grounds, so it is impossible for Polk County to challenge the ruling in the U.S. Supreme Court. Short of a state constitutional amendment, which simply can't be done in three weeks, this ruling will remain the law in Iowa. Same-sex couples (apparently there are 5,800 of them in Iowa) will start marrying.

The County advanced a number of arguments in support of its claim that the state statute should be upheld: maintaining traditional marriage, promotion of optimal environment to raise children, promotion of procreation, promoting stability in opposite-sex relationships, and conservation of resources. First, the court found no governmental interest in maintaining traditional marriage. Second, it found that same-sex parents fare just as well as opposite sex ones in raising children. It also found that the exclusion of same-sex marriages did not promote procreation or stability in opposite-sex relationships. Finally, it found that the state's interest in conserving resources was not substantially improved by keeping same-sex marriages illegal.

The court then addressed "the reason for the exclusion of gay and lesbian couples from civil marriage left unspoken by the County: religious opposition to same-sex marriage." It found that even though a religious objection is not sufficient to uphold the statute, even some religions support same-sex marriage:

This contrast of opinions in our society largely explains the absence of any religion-based rationale to test the constitutionality of Iowa’s same-sex marriage ban. Our constitution does not permit any branch of government to resolve these types of religious debates and entrusts to courts the task of ensuring government avoids them.

p. 65. Citing the separation of church and state, the court makes clear that this case must be decided on equal protection grounds, and not on free exercise of religion grounds.

Finally, perhaps the best sentence of the whole opinion, on p. 69: "All justices concur."

Today's a proud day to be an Iowan.